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COMMENTS

AFTER THE IMPACT RULE-LIMITING DEFENDANT'S
LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS CASES: BASS v. NOONEY CO.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Bass v. Nooney Co.,1 the Supreme Court of Missouri abandoned the
rule that a defendant is not liable for negligence which produces emotional distress unless the plaintiff suffers a contemporaneous physical injury or impact. This "impact rule" was the majority position in the
United States in the first part of this century2 and had been a part of
Missouri's jurisprudence since 1881.1 In Bass, however, Missouri joined
the mainstream of American jurisprudence by providing judicial protection against a plaintiff's loss of emotional tranquility without requiring
contemporaneous physical impact.4
Today, with the impact rule discredited and most jurisdictions providing increased protection to emotions, the problem facing the courts is not
how to allow a plaintiff to recover for negligently caused emotional distress, but rather how to keep a defendant's liability in such cases within
manageable limits. Once the requirement of physical impact is removed,
it is often difficult to determine when the defendant has committed a
breach of a duty of care to the plaintiff which has resulted in legally cognizable damage.5 This determination is particularly difficult in "bystander" cases in which the plaintiff's emotional distress is caused by his
fear that a third party will be injured by the defendant's negligent con1. 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
2. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.4, at 1032-33 (1956); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 330-31 (4th ed. 1971); see also infra text accompa-

nying notes 26-35.
3. See Trigg v. Saint Louis, K.C. & N. Ry., 74 Mo. 147 (1881).
4. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 2, § 18.4, at 1034; W. PRoSsER, supra note 2, §
54, at 332; see also Lambert, Tort Liability for Psychic Injuries:Overview and Update, 37

ATLA L.J. 1, 1(1978). See generally Annot., 64 A.L.R.2D 100 (1959). Currently, only seven
jurisdictions retain the impact rule: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Utah,
and the District of Columbia. See infra note 33.
5. See, e.g., Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965) (plaintiff nearly

struck by train because of defendant's negligence); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d
12 (1965) (plaintiff nearly struck by defendant's negligently driven car); see also W. PROSsnn, supra note 2, § 54, at 328 ("danger of vexatious suits and fictitious claims").
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duct or by his shock or mental anguish at witnessing such an injury.' This
problem of defining the defendant's liability has led courts to substitute
for the impact rule some other type of test or requirement to determine
when and to whom a defendant will be liable in an emotional distress
7

case.

This comment will focus on two areas: (1) examination of Bass v.
Nooney Co. and its significance in relation to the standards utilized in
other jurisdictions in emotional distress cases; and (2) a detailed survey of
the standards currently employed nationally to define a defendant's liability and a plaintiff's right of recovery in negligent infliction of emotional
distress cases.

II. RECOVERY FOR NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED EMOTIONAL DIsmEss IN
MISSOURI

A.

Statement of the Case

On April 6, 1976, Collette Bass was stuck in an elevator located in a
building owned and operated by the Nooney Company. Although Bass
was freed within thirty minutes, the experience unnerved her to such an
extent that the next day she collapsed while riding an elevator in the
same building.8 When Mrs. Bass arrived at a local hospital, she was
"hyperventilating, unable to speak above a murmur, was lightheaded and
anxious. ' Bass spent five days in the hospital, during which time she
6. See, e.g., Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 129,
259 A.2d 12 (1969); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). In all these
cases, the courts denied recovery to a bystander for fear of creating unlimited liability for
would be an entirely unreathe defendant. Prosser recognized the problem, noting that "[ilt
sonable burden on all human activity if the defendant who has endangered one man were to
be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person disturbed by reason of it
.... " W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 54, at 334. See generally, Annot., 29 A.L.R.3D 1337
(1970).
7. Today 41 states employ one or more of the following- a) a requirement that the emotional distress manifest itself in contemporaneous or subsequent physical injury; b) a zoneof-danger test which requires that the plaintiff be in danger of physical impact or injury as a
result of the defendant's negligent conduct; and/or c) some type of basic foreseeability requirement (different courts provide different guidelines as to when a plaintiff or his injuries
are foreseeable). The distinction between the zone-of-danger test and the foreseeability
standard is somewhat artificial as many states with the zone-of-danger test claim to have a
standard based on foreseeability. They merely define the foreseeable plaintiff as one in the
zone of danger or find that plaintiff's injuries are foreseeable only if he is in danger of physical injury. See infra text accompanying notes 58-60. The distinction is made in this comment in order to differentiate between those jurisdictions defining foreseeability spatially
and those using other guidelines. These tests and requirements are discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 42-96.
8.Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
9. Id. at 767.
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experienced acute anxiety, slurred speech, loss of balance, lightheadedness, and inability to sleep. After her release from the hospital, she
did not return to work for almost a month and continued to get tense in
0
elevators and while riding in cars.2
Bass sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court
entered a directed verdict for the defendant, and the court of appeals
affirmed because the plaintiff had suffered no physical impact at the time
of the elevator episode." The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and
remanded. 2
The Missouri Supreme Court's opinion is interesting, not so much for
its rejection of the impact rule'3 as for the test adopted in its place. Most
jurisdictions which have abandoned the impact rule still require that the
plaintiff suffer emotional distress which manifests itself in contemporaneous or subsequent physical injury in order to recover.' 4 The Missouri
court, however, found adoption of such a requirement to be merely "the
replacement of one arbitrary, artificial rule with another which ...
[is]
only somewhat less restrictive.'" Furthermore, the court noted that it is
often difficult, if not impossible, to separate physical injuries from purely
mental or emotional injuries.' 6 The court therefore decided not to require
that the plaintiff suffer a physical injury in order to recover for emotional
distress but to allow recovery when the emotional distress is "medically
diagnosable" and "of sufficient severity so as to be medically significant."' 7 To avoid unduly extending the defendant's liability, the court
also laid down the requirement that "the defendant should have realized
that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the [emotional]
distress."' 8
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 774.
13. The court considered and rejected three major justifications usually offered in support
of the impact rule. Difficulty in proving a causal connection between plaintiff's damages and

defendant's act had been overcome, the court felt, by modem advances in psychiactric testing and diagnostic techniques. Id. at 769-70. As to the necessity of impact in order to pre-

vent fraudulent claims, the court asserted that the judicial system itself contains sufficient
safeguards to prevent such claims while allowing recovery in deserving cases. Id. at 770.

Finally, the justices were not intimidated by the fear of a "flood of litigation" following

abrogation of the impact rule, noting that such a flood had failed to materialize in those
jurisdictions which had previously dropped the rule. Id.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 42-57. This requirement is usually seen as a way to
ensure the genuineness of plaintiff's claim. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 770; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 436A comment b (1965); see also Comment, Recovery Allowed for Negligently
Inflicted Mental Distress Without Requirement of Contemporaneous Physical Injury, 16
ViL.L. REv. 1011, 1018-20 (1971).
15. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 771.
16. Id.

17. Id. at 772-73.
18. Id. at 772.
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B. Significance of the Decision
With the Bass decision, Missouri became one of only a handful of jurisdictions not requiring a physical injury in order to recover for emotional
distress.1" The foreseeability standard adopted by the court is unusual in
that it contains no guidelines by which to judge foreseeability and thus
allows a very broad reading of when and under what circumstances a
plaintiff's injuries are indeed foreseeable. By contrast, many jurisdictions
which purport to have also adopted a basic foreseeability standard qualify
that standard by imposing a requirement either that the plaintiff be in
danger of physical impact or injury as a result of the defendant's negligent conduct 0 or that a bystander plaintiff actually witness the accident
caused by the defendant's negligence and that the party physically injured in the accident be closely related to the plaintiff.2 1
The standard for recovery established in Bass is also very liberal in
that it does not require any physical manifestation of the emotional distress. 22 Practically every other jurisdiction which has abandoned the impact rule requires a physical manifestation as a prerequisite to the plaintiff's recovery.2" Since 1975, however, there has been some movement
away from this requirement, 24 and with this decision, Missouri joined that
modern trend.
Finally, the court's decision in Bass is significant because of its possible
application beyond the fact situation presented in the case itself. Al19. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
20. This is known as the zone-of-danger test. See, e.g., Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517,
579 P.2d 1163 (1978) (house blew up while plaintiff standing close by); Orlo v. Connecticut
Co., 128 Conn. 231, A.2d 402 (1941) (plaintiff in car with live electric wires "flashing, spitting and hissing" about it. Id. at
, 21 A.2d at 402.); Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282
Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969) (plaintiff standing next to wall of building when it
collapsed).
21. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (mother
witnessed daughter's death as result of defendant's negligence); Barnhill v. Davis, 300
N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981) (plaintiff saw car containing his mother struck by defendant's car);
Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (plaintiff witnessed sister's death
by drowning as result of defendant's negligence).
22. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772.
23. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 2, § 18.4, at 1031 (1956); Comment, Maine
and Michigan Abolish the "ImpactRule," 20 DE PAuL L. REV. 1029, 1045-46 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Maine and Michigan]; Comment, Recovery Allowed for Mental
Distress Absent Both Impact and Fear of Impact, 46 Miss. L.J. 871, 877 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Recovery Allowed for Mental Distress]; Comment, supra note 14, at
1013-14. See generally Annot., 64 A.L.R.2D 100 (1959). This is also the view taken by the
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965), which holds that "[i]f the actor's conduct is
negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or
other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance."
24. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
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though Bass is a typical emotional distress case in that the defendant's
negligence directly affected the plaintiff, the rule of basic foreseeability
and "medically diagnosable" injury promulgated by the court is broad
enough to encompass a plaintiff who suffers emotional distress because of
his fear that a third party will be injured by a defendant's negligent conshock at witnessing such an injury to an
duct or because of the2 plaintiff's
5
unrelated third party.
M.
A.

SURVEY OF NATIONAL PosmIONs LIMITING DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY IN
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CASES

Historical Standards-TheImpact Rule

Historically, the judicial system has afforded little protection to victims
of negligently inflicted emotional distress. 26 In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, recovery was allowed in situations in which
there had been some physical "impact" upon the plaintiff.27 The underlying theory seemed to be that the "impact" provided a guarantee that the
emotional distress was genuine, thereby keeping the defendant's liability
within manageable limits.2
25. The court, in an enigmatic footnote, declines "to discuss the extensive debate and
differing rules which [have] developed in the 'bystander' cases. .. ." Bass, 646 S.W.2d at
770 n.3. The fact remains, however, that the test adopted in this case, standing alone, would
permit such recovery. In fact, the court cites several of the major bystander recovery cases
as precedent for its decision. Id. at 772. Cf. Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d
1096 (1976), in which the Washington Supreme Court adopted a test very much like the
Bass test-foreseeable risk of injury and emotional distress "manifested by objective symptomatology," id. at
.
553 P.2d at 1103, and specifically refused to rule out its use to
permit bystander recovery, leaving the jury to decide if recovery in such a case should be
allowed.
26. Recovery has always been allowed, however, where the plaintiff has suffered emotional
distress as a result of a bodily injury caused by the defendant's negligence. Such damages
are usually called "parasitic," since the real cause of action is the bodily injury. 2 F. HARR
& F. JAMZS, supra note 2, § 18.4 at 1032; W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 54, at 330.
27. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, § 18.4 at 1033; W. PROSSEa, supra note 2, § 54,
at 330-31. A detailed discussion of the impact rule is beyond the scope of this article. The
rule, however, has been examined extensively by the commentators. See generally Goodrich,
Emotional Disturbanceas Legal Damage, 20 IMcH L. REv. 497 (1922); Magruder, Mental
and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033 (1936); Smith,
Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease:Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L.
REv. 193 (1944); Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARv. L. REv. 260 (1921); Comment, Maine and Michigan,supra note 23; Comment, Should the Florida Supreme Court
Replace the Impact Rule with a ForeseeabilityAnalysis? 11 FL. ST. U.L. REV. 231 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Florida Supreme Court]; Comment, Duty, Foreseeability,
and the Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 33 ME. L. Rev. 303 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Duty, Foreseeability];Comment, Recovery Allowed for Mental Distress,
supra note 23; Comment, The Impact Rule-Nuisance or Necessity?, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 368
(1973); Comment, supra note 14.
28. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supranote 2, § 18.4, at 1033; W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 54,
at 330-31.
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Although the rule gained wide acceptance in the United States,29 it was
applied mechanically and often produced exceedingly harsh results.3 0
Courts soon began searching for ways to mitigate the harsh results 31 or
declined to adopt the rule altogether.3 2 As a result, over the last fifty
years there has been a distinct movement away from the impact rule, until today only six states and the District of Columbia continue to cling to
the rule.33 However, few courts have been willing to make negligent inffic29. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 54, at 330-31.
30. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) overruled by
Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). In Mitchell, the
defendant's negligently operated horse-drawn trolley charged the terrified plaintiff and
finally stopped with the horses' heads on either side of her. Plaintiff fainted and subsequently suffered a miscarriage. The court ruled that because there was no impact, there
could be no recovery.
31. The most popular method for circumventing the rule was to find that almost anything
qualified as impact. See, e.g., Interstate Life and Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599,
193 S.E. 458 (1937) (insurance agent struck plaintiff's body with a coin); Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928) (defendant's horse defecated into
plaintiff's lap); Kisiel v. Holyoke St. Ry., 240 Mass. 29, 132 N.E. 622 (1921) (slight jar);
Bendenk v. Saint Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 285 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1955) (slight bruise); McCardle
v. George B. Peck Dry Goods Co., 271 Mo. 111, 195 S.W. 1034 (1917) (elevator struck bottom with thud); Proter v. L.W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in eyes); Morton
v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of smoke). Obviously such trivial
impacts do nothing to ensure the genuineness of the emotional distress and therefore do not
support one of the underlying rationales for the impact rule.
32. See, e.g., Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896); Purcell v. Saint
Paul City R.R., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892).
33. ARKANSAS: The rule was apparently adopted in Saint Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Bragg,
69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (1901) (plaintiff claimed injury to health from fright resulting from
being put off train some distance from depot at night). The rule apparently remains law in
Arkansas today. In Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark.
1959), a federal district court stated that "[iut is a well settled principle of Arkansas law that
no recovery can be had for negligently inflicted mental anguish ... unless the same is produced by a physical injury, and that rule extends to physical symptoms resulting from emotional shock . . . ." Id. at 697. The required impact, however, may be slight or even constructive. See Butler County Ry. v. Exum, 124 Ark. 229, 187 S.W. 329 (1916) (impact found
in tobacco smoke touching plaintiff's body).
FLORIDA: The rule was embraced in International Ocean Tel. Co. v. Saunders, 32 Fla. 434,
14 So. 148 (1893), and, despite dissatisfaction in the lower courts, continues to be good law
today. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974) (confirming the validity of the
impact rule), rev'g 271 So. 2d 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (rejecting the impact rule). The
rule may soon change; the question of whether Florida should retain the rule was recently
certified to the state supreme court. Champion v. Gray, 420 So. 2d 348 (Fla. Dist CL App.
1982). It should be noted that Florida does not apply the impact rule when the emotional
distress was intentionally inflicted, when the defendant acted maliciously, or in products
liability cases. Comment, Florida Supreme Court, supra note 27, at 237-38.
GEORGIA: Adopted in Chapman v. Western Union TeL Co., 88 Ga. 763, 15 S.E. 901
(1892),the impact rule, despite differing opinions in the lower courts, continues to be the law
today. Compare Usry v. Small, 103 Ga. App. 144, 118 S.E.2d 719 (1961) (no impact required) with Strickland v. Hodges, 134 Ga. App. 909, 216 S.E.2d 706 (1975) (impact rule
retained except for special situations such as a "willful" act directed towards plaintiff). The
rule in practice seems to be that a plaintiff can recover for emotional distress caused by
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tion of emotional distress an independent tort by merely applying basic
negligence principles to determine when and under what circumstances a
defendant will be liable. 4 Instead, even after abandoning the impact rule,
most jurisdictions have continued to follow some type of mechanical rule
when making a determination of liability.3 5
simple negligence only if the emotional distress is "accompanied by physical injury or pecu243 S.E.2d
niary loss." Hall County Memorial Park, Inc. v. Baker, 145 Ga. App. 296, -,
689, 691 (1978). Such a rule, of course, precludes any bystander recovery. See Howard v.
Bloodworth, 137 Ga. App. 478, 224 S.E.2d 122 (1976).
INDIANA: The rule was adopted in Kalen v. Terre Haute & I. R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 47
N.E. 694 (1897) and, except for intentional inflictions of emotional distress, continues to be
the law today. The impact itself, however, need not be the actual cause of the emotional
distress. See Kroger Co. v. Beck, 176 Ind. App. 202, 375 N.E.2d 640 (1978) (plaintiff's throat
pricked by a hypodermic needle in a piece of meat held to satisfy the impact requirement).
KENTUCKY: In Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23
S.W.2d 272 (1929), the court declared that there can be no recovery for fright or its physical
consequences without impact. Kentucky will, however, recognize even a slight impact as
sufficient to support the cause of action as long as the mental distress is related to and a
direct, natural result of the physical impact. Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.
1980) (x-ray of the plaintiff without testing her for pregnancy found to be sufficient impact).
UTAH: In Sanmns v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961), the Utah court held that
only intentionally inflicted emotional distress was actionable without bodily impact or physical injury. This continues to be the law today. Reiser v. Lenner, 641 P.2d 93, 100 (Utah
1982) ("It is well established in Utah that a cause of action for emotional distress may not
be based upon mere negligence."). The rule has also been applied to prevent bystander recovery. See Madison v. Deseret Livestock Co., 574 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying
Utah law).
WASHINGTON, D.C.: In Perry v. Capital Traction Co., 32 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 280 U.S. 577 (1929), the court held that there could be no recovery for injury
"brought about solely by a nervous shock or fright." 32 F.2d at 939. The court in Garber v.
United States, 578 F.2d 414 (D.C. Cir. 1978), affirmed that this rule is still the law today.
Idaho is sometimes labeled an impact rule state. See Winter, A Tort in Transition:Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 70 A.B.A. J. 62, 64 (Mar., 1984). The case law, however,
is less than clear on this point. In Summers v. Western Idaho Potato Processing Co., 94
Idaho 1, 479 P.2d 292 (1970), the court declared that there was no common law right of
.
479 P.2d at 293.
recovery for "purely emotional trauma, negligently caused" Id. at
The court went on to note that some jurisdictions had extended a right of recovery for
negligently inflicted emotional distress "only so far as to allow recovery where there were
.,
479 P.2d at 293. Because the case was
physical manifestations of the injury." Id. at
brought under a workers' compensation scheme which precluded such recovery, the court
failed to indicate if Idaho would allow recovery for physical manifestations of negligently
_
479 P.2d
inflicted emotional distress in a non-workers' compensation context. Id. at
at 293. Nine years later, however, in Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Nw., 100 Idaho 840,
606 P.2d 944, 955 (1980), the Idaho Supreme Court declared the holding of Summers
to be that there could be no recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress "in the
absence of physical causes or manifestations" (emphasis added). If by this the court meant
that there could be recovery when the emotional distress is accompanied by physical manifestations, Idaho cannot be seen as an impact rule state.
34. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
35. "[T]he retreat from the 'impact rule' has been marked by rear-guard actions in which
other mechanical rules have cut off duty short of the full range of the reasonably foreseeable." 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, supra note 2, § 18.4, at 1036.
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B. Current Standardsfor Limiting a Defendant's Liability
The traditional justifications given for the impact rule were that impact
helped prove proximate cause, 6 that it helped eliminate fictitious claims
by insuring the genuineness of the plaintiff's injuries, 1 and that abandoning the rule would result in a tremendous increase in litigation."
There also seemed to be an underlying fear that even legitimate claims of
negligently inflicted emotional distress "would impose an impossibly high
standard of conduct and make the burden of liability too great."39 Courts
and commentators alike have attacked the validity of the first three justifications many times over.40 However, the fourth justification, that of
somehow restricting defendant's liability to keep it within manageable
limits, remains a problem today.41
1. Requirement that Plaintiff Suffer Contemporaneous or Subsequent
Physical Injury.
One way the courts have dealt with the problem of preventing unlimited liability has been to require that the plaintiff's emotional distress
manifest itself in either a contemporaneous or subsequent physical in-

jury. 42 This requirement is generally seen as an effective way to ensure

the genuineness of the plaintiff's injuries, eliminating false claims and
while at the same time not unduly
thereby protecting deserving plaintiffs
43
extending defendants' liability.
36. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled by
Battlla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
37. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
38. See, e.g., id.
39. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra, note 2, § 18.4, at 1033 (1956).
40. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 54, at 327.
41. Id. at 334; Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v.
Legg in Californiaand Other States, 25 HASTINGS L. J. 1248, 1250 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Negligent Infliction]; Comment, Duty, Foreseeability,supra note 27, at 308.
See generally cases cited supra note 6.
42. See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2D 100, 115-19 (1959) (noting that no courts at that time had
allowed recovery for mental distress unconnected either with an independently actionable
tort or with a contemporaneous or subsequent physical injury). Cf. infra notes 45-50 and
accompanying text. Prosser states that "[t]he temporary emotion of fright, so far from serious that it does no physical harm, is so evanescent a thing, so easily counterfeited, and
usually so trivial, that the courts have been quite unwilling to protect the plaintiff against
mere negligence . . . ." W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 54, at 329.
43. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 926-28, 616 P.2d 813, 818-19,
21 A.2d
167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835-37 (1980); Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, _
402, 405 (1941). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 436A comment b (1965); Comment Florida Supreme Court, supra note 27, at 248; Comment, Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress Absent Physical Impact or Subsequent Physical Injury, 47 Mo. L. Rxv.
124, 126 (1982).
One of the major problems with a requirement of physical injury before there can be
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Most jurisdictions have allowed recovery, assuming all other rules and
requirements are met, where the plaintiff's emotional distress manifests
itself in some subsequent physical injury.44 Some courts, however, have
refused to stray far from the original impact rule and require that the
plaintiff's emotional distress manifest itself in a contemporaneous physical injury.45 Such a rule is virtually indistinguishable from the impact rule
recovery for emotional distress is drawing the distinction between a physical injury and a

mental one. This distinction is often difficult to make, and courts requiring a physical injury
have not been uniform in their determination of what constitutes a physical injury. Compare Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909) (plaintiff's "nervous
prostration" found to be physical injury) with Cosgrove v. Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824 (D. Del
1965) (dizziness, nervousness, and headache held not to constitute physical injury). See generally Annot., 64 A.L.R.2D 100, 104-05 (1959). The Restatement would accept long continued nausea, headaches, or dizziness as physical injury and would even recognize as physical
injury such clearly mental manifestations as repeated hysterical attacks. The Restatement
suggests that the final determination should be made by the medical profession rather than
the law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 436A comment c (1965).
44. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916); Keck v.
Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979); Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P.
320 (1896); Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Nw., 100 Idaho
840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980); Clemm v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 126 Kan. 181, 268 P. 103 (1928);
Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970) (later overruled on the
physical manifestation requirement in Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d
433 (Me. 1982)); Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909); Dziokonki
v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Daley v. La Croix, 384 Mich. 4, 179
N.W.2d 390 (1970); Purcell v. Saint Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); First
Nat'l Bank v. Langley, 314 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1975); Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry., 96 Mont.
92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934); Hanford v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 113 Neb 423, 203 N.W. 643
(1925); Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 A. 540 (1930);
Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Aragon v. Speelman, 83 N.M. 285, 491
P.2d 173 (1971); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961);
Neiderman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I.
186, 66 A. 202 (1907); Mack v. South-Bound R.R., 52 S.C. 323, 29 S.E. 905 (1898); Memphis
St. Ry. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.W. 902 (1917); Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13
S.W. 59 (1890); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 234 A.2d 656 (1967); Hughes v.
Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973); Frazee v. Western Dairy Prods., 182 Wash. 578,
47 P.2d 1037 (1935); Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924); Colla v.
Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
112 S.E.2d 48, 52
45. NORTH CAROLINA: In Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, (1960), the court required that either physical impact or genuine physical injury take place
"coincident in time and place with the occurrence producing the mental stress .... ." In
North Carolina, however, the contemporaneous physical injury need not be a visible, such as
, 157 S.E.2d 381, 386 (1967)
a broken arm. Crews v. Provident Fin. Co., 271 N.C. 684,
("nervousness requiring bed rest brought on by acute attack of angina and increased blood
pressure constituted physical injury").
OKLAHo?,w Oklahoma appears to require a contemporaneous physical injury. In Belt v.
Saint Louis & S.F. Ry., 195 F.2d 241, 243 (10th Cir. 1952), the federal appeals court stated
that emotional distress "must be a part of the physical suffering and inseparable therefrom,
as where the mental anguish is superinduced by physical hunger pains." In Saint Louis &
-,
150 P. 1026, 1028 (1915), the court declared that
S.F. Ry. v. Keiffer, 48 Okla. 434,
there can be no recovery for emotional distress "which is not produced by, connected with,
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and is thus open to the same46 basic criticism as the impact rule-that its
results will be unduly harsh.

In 1970, in Rodrigues v. State,47 Hawaii became the first state to abandon completely any requirement of physical injury in an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Rodrigues, the plaintiff's new
house was flooded because of defendant's negligent maintenance of a
drainage ditch.4 While admitting potential problems of proof and difficulty in limiting the defendant's liability, the court recognized the plaintiff's right to be free from the negligent infliction of serious emotional
distress regardless of the presence or absence of physical injury."' The
court defined serious mental distress as distress which "a reasonable man,
normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with. .. .
Several other jurisdictions have followed suit and abandoned the requirement of physical manifestations of the emotional distress. 1 Four
reasons are generally given for this liberalization of the rules for recovery.
First, the requirement of a physical manifestation is said to be overinclusive because it allows recovery for trivial emotional distress which is accompanied by physical symptoms.52 Second, the rule is said to be underinclusive because it denies recovery for serious emotional distress which
does not produce physical symptoms.53 Third, requiring physical injury
or the result of physical suffering or injury ......
OREGON: In"Rostad v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 101 Or. 569, 201 P. 184 (1921),
the Oregon court required that emotional distress be accompanied by physical injury. The
court in Melton v. Allen, 282 Or. 731, 580 P.2d 1019 (1978), affirmed that this requirement
is the law, the only exception being for outrageous conduct by the defendant.
SOUTH DAKOTA: In Sternhagen v. Kozel, 40 S.D. 396, 167 N.W. 398 (1918), the court required that physical injury accompany fright before recovery will be allowed. This continues
to be the rule today. Chisum v. Behrens, 283 N.W.2d 235 (S.D. 1979).
46. The only appreciable difference between the two rules is that, under the contempora-

neous physical injury requirement, it is not necessary that the impact or injury precede the
emotional distress. It does not matter whether the physical injury causes the emotional distress or is caused by it. Comment, Duty, Foreseeability,supra note 27, at 304; see Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960); Sternhagen v. Kozel, 40 S.D. 396, 167
N.W. 398 (1918).

47. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
48. Id. at
, 472 P.2d at 513.
49. Id. at
, 472 P.2d at 520.
50. Id. Accord Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).

51. See, e.g. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980); Montinieri v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 1975 Conn. 337, 398 A.2d 1180
(1978); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Bass v. Nooney
Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 251 (1980);
Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983); Sinn v. Burd, 486
Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979).

52. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838; Culbert, 444 A-2d
at 437.
53. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838; Culbert, 444 A.2d

at 437.
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"encourages extravagant pleading and distorted testimony."" Finally,
some courts are now convinced that medical science is able to prove
psychic injury even in the absence of physical injury. 55 Those jurisdictions
which have dispensed with the requirement of physical manifestations of
the emotional distress, generally limit the defendant's liability by requiring that the psychic injury be serious"6 and foreseeable. 57
2.

Requirement that the Plaintiff Be Within the Zone of Danger.

Many jurisdictions, upon abandoning the impact rule, have substituted
for it a definition of liability based on the plaintiff's presence within the
zone of physical danger created by the defendant's negligent act.58 These
courts also generally require that the plaintiff, while in this "zone of danger," suffer the emotional distress as a result of fear for his own safety
rather than for the safety of another.5 9 The zone-of-danger test is seen by
54. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838; Culbert, 444 A.2d
at 437; see Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772.
55. See, e.g., Sinn, 486 Pa. at
, 404 A.2d at 679. But see Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 771
("difficult if not impossible to separate physical from ... purely mental and emotional
reaction.").
56. See, e.g., Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839; Leong,
55 Hawaii at _
, 520 P.2d at 764; Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii at _
, 472 P.2d at 520;
Culbert,444 A.2d at 437; Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772; Portee, 84 N.J. at
417 A.2d at 527;
Schultz, 4 Ohio St. 3d at _ 447 N.E.2d at 113; Sinn, 486 Pa. at
, 404 A.2d at 683.
57. See e.g., Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35;
Leong, 55 Hawaii at
.
520 P.2d at 765; Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii at _
472 P.2d at
521; Culbert, 444 A.2d at 435; Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772; Portee, 84 N.J. at . 417 A.2d at
525; Sinn, 486 Pa. at
404 A.2d at 684-85.
58. Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979); Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo.
517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978); Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Robb
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 DeL 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98
11.2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Okrina
v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969); Fournell v. Usher Pest Control
Co., 208 Neb. 684, 305 N.W.2d 605 (1981); Jelley v. LaFlame, 108 N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728
(1968), overruled by Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Falzone v. Busch,
45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301
N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Neiderman
v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 A.
202 (1907); Trent v. Barrows, 55 Tenn. App. 182, 397 S.W.2d 409 (1965); Houston Elec. Co.
v. Dorsett, 194 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1946); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 234
A.2d 656 (1967); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); see Rogers v.
Hexol, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 453 (D. Or. 1962); Bourgue v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 345
So. 2d 237 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862
(1934); Mack v. South-Bound R.R., 52 S.C. 323, 29 S.E. 905 (1898). This is also the rule
adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 313, 436 (1965).
59. See, e.g., Whetman, 197 N.W.2d at 684 (no recovery for mother who saw nurse drop
her baby); Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978) (no recovery for father who suffered emotional distress as a result of daughter's injuries); Klassa v.
Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956) (plaintiff could not recover
for shock or fright which was solely the result of fear for safety of two sons); RESTATEmENT
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the courts as a way to avoid some of the arbitrariness of the old impact
rule while at the same time restricting the defendant's liability to a class
of plaintiffs whose injuries are reasonably foreseeable.60
In practice, the zone of danger standard has alleviated some of the inequities of the impact rule. Unlike the impact rule, the zone-of-danger
test allows recovery when the plaintiff is endangered but is not touched l
and also allows recovery for a bystander within the zone who fears for his
own safety.6 2 Since the exact extent of the zone is decided on a case-by-

case basis, the courts are freed from a mechanical application of the
standard.6 8
Unfortunately, the zone-of-danger test, like the impact rule, is an arbitrary line drawn to restrict recovery for policy reasons and, as such, is
capable of producing harsh and seemingly capricious results.6 Courts frequently use the rule to deny recovery to a bystander not located within
the zone of danger,65 arguing that to allow recovery outside the zone
would be to invite unlimited liability with no reasonable circumscription.66 These courts are generally of the view that the application of basic
negligence principles with an emphasis on foreseeability would not be suf(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 313 comment d (1965).
60. See, e.g., Resavage, 199 Md. at
_
86 A.2d at 880-83; Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d
552, 554 (Minn. 1980).
61. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 58.
62. See, e.g., Keck, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668; Rickey, 98 i. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1;
Bowman, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182; Niederman, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(3) (1965).
63. See, e.g., Rickey 98 Il. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (case remanded for a determination of
whether plaintiff, riding an ordinary escalator, was within zone of danger).
64. It was just such a result that prompted the California Supreme Court to abandon the
zone-of-danger rule. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal Rptr. 72 (1968); see
infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Stadler v. Cross, 295
N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d
554 (1969); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Shelton v. Russell
Pipe Foundry Co.,, 570 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259
A.2d 12 (1969); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
66. Resavage, 199 Md. at _
, 86 A.2d at 882 (liability "can neither justly nor expediently be extended. . . ."); Stadler, 295 N.W.2d at 554 ("[A] person's liability for the consequences of her or his actions cannot be unlimited."); Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 616, 249 N.W.2d
at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 555 ("The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of
wrongs to a controllable degree."); Whetham, 197 N.W.2d at 683 (recovery presents "the
problem of the defendant's unlimited liability"); Shelton, 570 S.W.2d at 866 (It would be
"unjust" to impose such liability upon defendant "who is guilty only of negligence rather
than intentional wrongdoing."); Guilmette, 128 Vt. at
-,
259 A.2d at 15 ("Recovery
must be brought within manageable dimensions."); Grimsby 85 Wash. 2d at _
, 530 P.2d
at 294 ("[T]here appears to be no rational way to restrict the scope of liability."); Waube,
258 N.W. at 500 (Recovery "would constitute an unwarranted enlargement of the duties of
users of the highway.").
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ficient to keep liability within manageable dimensions.6 7
Despite its shortcomings, the zone-of-danger test is now the majority
position 8 since most courts consider it to be an adequate balance between the necessity of limiting the defendant's liability and the need to
allow deserving plaintiffs to recover. 9 Nevertheless, there is a rapidly developing trend, especially in bystander cases, to dispense with the restrictive zone-of-danger foreseeability standard" and instead to utilize a more
liberal test of foreseeability based on spatial considerations and other factors, such as sensory observation of the accident caused by the defendant's negligence
and the relationship between the plaintiff and the
71
victim.

3. Requirement of Basic Foreseeability-Bystander Cases.
In 1968 California became the first state to abandon the zone-of-danger
restriction and allow recovery by a bystander outside the zone. In Dillon
v. Legg,7 2 a mother, who was outside the zone of danger, witnessed her
daughter's death caused by the defendant's negligent act and sued for
emotional distress and resulting physical injuries.7 3 Another daughter,
who also witnessed the accident and suffered emotional distress and
physical injuries, was within the zone of danger. 4 Thus under California's
zone-of-danger rule, the sister could recover, while the bystander-mother
could not.7 5 Such a capricious result was intolerable to the court. There76
fore, it ruled that the defendant was indeed liable to the mother.

The court substituted the basic negligence principle of reasonable foreseeability for the zone-of-danger limitation. Realizing, however, that recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress presents a greater po67. In Tobin, the New York court observed that
[t]he problem of unlimited liability is suggested by the unforeseeable consequences of
extending recovery for harm to others than those directly involved in the accident. If

foreseeability be the sole test, then once liability is extended the logic of the principle
would not and could not remain confined. It would extend to older children, fathers,
grandparents, relatives, or others in loco parentis,and even to sensitive caretakers, or
even any other affected bystanders.
24 N.Y.2d at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559. See also Resavage, 199 Md. at
, 86 A.2d at 882; Stadler, 295 N.W.2d at 555.

68. See jurisdictions and cases cited supra note 58.
69. See, e.g., Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 615-18, 249 N.E.2d at 422-24, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558-61.
70. See Lambert, supra note 4; Comment, Duty, Foreseeability,supra note 27.
71. See, e.g., Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72. See generally Annot.,
5 A.L.R.4TH 833 (1981); Annot., 94 A.L.R.3D 486 (1979); Annot., 29 A.L.R.3D 1337 (1970).
72. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
73. Id. at 728, 441 P.2d at 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
74. Id. at
.
441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
75. California had adopted the zone-of-danger rule seven years earlier in Amaya v. Home
Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
76. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at
_, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
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tential for infinite liability than do other torts, the court set up a threepart test to aid in the determination of whether a defendant should have
reasonably foreseen injury to a particular plaintiff. The court looked to:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with... [being some] distance away from it. (2)Whether the shock
resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of
the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the
victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence
of any relation7
ship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
Initially, the Dillon approach received a less-than-enthusiastic response
outside California.7 8 Since 1973, however, the liberal approach typified by
Dillon has gained support, and today twelve states, including California,
allow a bystander plaintiff outside the zone of danger to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress79
77. Id. at
441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The second factor, requiring "sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident", has been modified to allow recovery
where there was no visual perception of the accident. Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562
P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977) (plaintiffs wife struck by defendant's car; plaintiff did
not see the impact but "fully perceived" it as he knew wife's position the instant before
impact and saw the car approaching her at high speed).
A recent decision by a California Court of Appeal extended liability even further by reversing a summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff arrived at the scene of the accident ten minutes after its occurrence. Nevels v. Yeager, 152 Cal. App. 3d 162, _ 199 Cal.
Rptr. 300, 305 (1984) (Dillonguidelines met "when a close relative arrives at the scene of an
accident soon after its occurrence, so that the scene is substantially as it was at the instant
of the accident and sees the victim, who has suffered severe injury with all its attendant
gore, and suffers shock therefrom ....).
78. The doctrine was considered and rejected in New York in Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969), and in Vermont in Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969). See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. See
generally Comment, Negligent Infliction, supra note 41.
79. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d
104 (Iowa 1981); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Dzi-

okonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1245 (1978); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich.

App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Por-

tee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979);
D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.L 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975) (Rhode Island retains the zoneof-danger requirement for non-bystander cases; bystander recovery is considered an exception to the general rule); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Civ. App. 1978); Hunsley
v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976). The law in Connecticut on this point is
somewhat confused. In Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959), the court
appeared to adopt a zone-of-danger test and in dictum announced that there could be no
bystander recovery for emotional distress caused by the sight of injury to another. Id. at
156 A.2d at 152. In D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d
129 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973), however, a state superior court adopted the Dillon standard
word for word. Three years later, another superior court in McGovern v. Piccolo, 33 Conn.
Supp. 225, 372 A.2d 989 (Conn Super. Ct. 1976), returned to the standard established in
Strazza.
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Six of these states have adopted the Dillon definition of foreseeability,
or some slight modification thereof, as the limitation on the defendant's
liability."' For example, Iowa has modified the basic Dillon test to require
that (1) the bystander and the victim be husband and wife or related
within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity; (2) the bystander
have reasonably believed that the victim was going to be seriously injured
or killed; and (3) the bystander suffer serious emotional distress.8 '
Four states have adopted standards more liberal than the Dillon standards. In Leong v. Takasaki,8 2 Hawaii permitted recovery by a bystander
who was not a blood relative of the victim. 8 3 Rather than restrict the defendant's liability by setting out factors which define foreseeability, the
Hawaii court merely applied basic negligence principles and held that a
defendant is liable "when it is reasonably foreseeable that a reasonable
plaintiff-witness to an accident would not be able to cope with the mental
stress engendered by such circumstances .... ."' The Court of Appeals
of Michigan declined to adopt any standard, noting that "devising one
hard and fast rule for limiting bystander recovery ...would be difficult
and complex if not impossible. ' 5 The court decided instead to resolve
each case on its own facts."8 Rhode Island rejected a straight foreseeability approach in favor of determining liability "by balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain how far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and expediently by extended. 8 s7 In Hunsley v.
80. Barnhill, 300 N.W.2d at 108 (modified Dillon test; see infra text at note 81); Culbert,
444 A.2d at 436 (Dillon factors); Dziokonski, 375 Mass. at
, 380 N.E.2d at 1302 (Dillon, plus "substantial physical injury ... caused by defendant's negligence"); Corson, 119
N.H. at _,
406 A.2d at 304-06 (balancing danger of unlimited liability with plaintiff's
serious emotional injury, balance can be maintained by "carefully defining the foreseeability
417 A.2d at
factors," using Dillon. Id. at _ 406 A.2d at 304.); Portee,.84 N.J. at .
.
404 A.2d at 685-86
528 (Dillon, plus "severe" emotional distress); Sinn, 486 Pa. at
(Dillon factors); Landreth, 570 S.W.2d at 489-90 (Dillonfactors). Texas, like California has
relaxed the "contemporaneous observance of the accident" requirement. See Bedgood v.
Madalin, 589 S.W.2d 797, 802-03 (Texas Civ. App. 1979). The Dziokonski Court noted, with
unusual candor, that
It does not matter in practice whether these factors are regarded as policy considerations imposing limitations on the scope of reasonable foreseeability ... or as factors
bearing on the determination of reasonable foreseeability itself. The fact is that, in
cases of this character, such factors are relevant in measuring the limits of liability
for emotionally based injuries resulting from a defendant's negligence.
Dziohonshi, 375 Mass. at
_ 380 N.E.2d at 1302.
81. Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d at 108.
82. 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
83. Id. at _ -, 520 P.2d at 760.
84. Id. at ..
, 520 P.2d at 765. Cf. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509
(1970).
85. Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, _ , 207 N.W.2d 140, 144 (1973).
86. Id. at
, 207 N.W.2d at 145.
, 338 A.2d 524, 528 (quoting Waube v.
87. D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.L 643,
Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935)).
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Giard,ss the Supreme Court of Washington emphasized foreseeability but

declined to adopt any particular foreseeability test.89 The court noted
that the "very concept of negligence provided the primary boundaries" on

the defendant's liability.90 The positions adopted in these four states represent the outermost limits of the defendant's liability now recognized in
emotional distress cases. 91
4. Requirement of Basic Foreseeability-Non-Bystander Cases.
Negligent infliction of emotional distress has traditionally been a tort

to which basic negligence principles are not applied unless supplemented
by some artificial limit on liability such as impact, physical manifesta-

tions of the distress, zone of danger, or specific guidelines for determining
foreseeability. In certain fact situations, however, courts have been willing
to apply basic tort principles without fear of unlimited liability. Traditionally, these "special circumstance" cases have concerned the negligent
transmission of telegraph messages 92 or the negligent mishandling of a
corpse.93 What these cases appear to have in common is a strong likeli-

hood, indeed almost a certainty, that the negligence will produce genuine,
severe emotional distress. 4
Some courts have been willing to extend the type of treatment given
the "special circumstance" cases to other situations in which the plaintiff
clearly deserves to recover but is not placed in any physical danger and at
88. 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976).
89. Id. at
, 553 P.2d at 1103.
90. Id. at
, 553 P.2d at 1103.
91. Attempts to extend the defendant's liability to a plaintiff who was not present at the
scene of the accident but who later learned of the victim's injury have been unsuccessful.
See Kelly v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975) (plaintiff
learned of death of family members over the phone and shortly thereafter suffered a fatal
heart attack as a result of severe emotional distress). But cf. Prince v. Pittston Co., 63
F.R.D. 28 (S.D. W. Va. 1974) (summary judgment improper where plaintiffs claimed severe
emotional distress despite their absence from the scene of the tortious activity).
92. See, e.g., Francis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 59 N.W. 1078 (1894). See
generally Comment, Telegraphs and Telephones-Telegraph Company Liable for Mental
Anguish Resulting from Non-Delivery, 29 NEB. L. Rv. 481 (1950).
93. See, e.g., Sandford v. Ware, 191 Va. 43, 60 S.E.2d 10 (1950). See generally Annot., 48
A.L.R.3D 261 (1973); Annot., 17 A.L.R.2D 770 (1951). It should be noted that in both the
telegraph cases and the corpse cases, recovery for mental anguish usually requires a showing
of willful, wanton, or malicious conduct on the part of the defendant. See Comment, supra
note 92, at 481-82; Annot., 48 A.L.R.3D at 270.
94. See e.g., Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980), in which the
defendant mortuary lost the cremated remains of the plaintiff's brother while shipping them
to Illinois. The court noted that "mental distress is a highly foreseeable result of such conduct.... [T]he nature of the wrongful conduct ... provides sufficient assurance of the
genuineness of a claim for emotional distress." Id. at 214-15, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 450. See also
W. PRossRa, supra note 2, § 54, at 330; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 436(1) (1965).
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no time fears for his own safety or the safety of another."5 The assumption seems to be that in a situation where the plaintiff's resulting severe
emotional distress is a virtual certainty, no artificial limitations are necessary to restrict liability.9" In other words, the damage is highly foreseeable.97 In cases following this reasoning, the courts have employed general
negligence standards, with major emphasis on foreseeability as the appropriate method for limiting defendant's liability.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The last 100 years have seen a definite trend toward greater judicial
protection for the plaintiff's interest in emotional tranquility. Courts have
moved from the restrictive position of denying recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress 8 to the more liberal approach of allowing
bystander recovery under certain circumstances. This movement, however, has been anything but smooth and uninterrupted. Fearing that the
defendant's liability cannot be kept within manageable limits, courts have
lumbered from one arbitrary limitation to another, searching for an equitable balance between the plaintiff's interest in recovering for emotional
harm and society's interest in avoiding any undue extension of liability.
Thus, courts have burdened this cause of action with such limitations as
the requirement of impact,9 9 the requirement of physical manifestations
of injury,100 the zone-of-danger test,101 and restrictive definitions of what
95. See cases cited infra note 97.
96. It should be noted, however, that some jurisdictions, even in these cases, still require
physical manifestations of the emotional distress. See Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants,
Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970); Daley v. La Croix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976); see also cases cited infra note 97.
97. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980) (plaintiff's wife incorrectly diagnosed as having syphilis); Montinieri v. Southern
New England Tel. Co., 175 Conn. 337, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978) (defendant telephone operator
gave out unlisted address resulting in plaintiff and his family being taken hostage); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (plaintiff's new house extensively damaged
by flood negligently caused by defendant on the day plaintiff was to move in); Wallace v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970) (plaintiff found an unpackaged
prophylactic in his soft drink); Daley v. La Croix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970) (defendant negligently drove his car into plaintiff's house); First Nat'l Bank v. Langley, 314 So.
2d 324 (Miss. 1975) (plaintiffs bank deposit hung up in night depository slot for several
weeks with plaintiff unable to convince defendant bank to search for it); Chiuchiolo v. New
England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 A. 540 (1930) (defendant, knowing that steam
pressure gauge in room where plaintiff worked had exploded several times before, failed to
repair guage); Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975)
(plaintiff incorrectly informed of mother's death by hospital); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d
424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976) (defendant negligently drove his car into plaintiff's house).
98. Damages for emotional distress have always been available, however, when parasitic
to some other actionable tort. See supra note 26.
99. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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constitutes reasonable foreseeability. 10 2 In general, courts have been reluctant to make negligent infliction of emotional distress a fully independent tort by giving it the same treatment afforded other negligence actions-the unfettered application of basic negligence principles.
The Missouri decision of Bass v. Nooney Co."' is a sharp break with
this tradition and represents the direction in which the law concerning
negligent infliction of emotional distress appears to be moving. In the last
fifteen years, two distinct trends have developed. First, the requirement
that the emotional distress manifest itself in physical injury shows signs
of weakening.'" To date, six states have abandoned this requirement and
recognized purely mental disturbance as a basis for legally cognizable
damage. In Bass, Missouri joins this small but important liberalizing
trend. Second, there is a general retreat from the arbitrary and artificial
tests for determining liability toward the application of basic tort principles. Bystander recovery is a movement in this direction although there is
still some tendency to restrict foreseeability in these cases to specific factual circumstances. 10 5 The trend away from arbitrary and artificial restrictions is most apparent in the expansion of the "special circumstance"
cases in which courts are willing to employ basic negligence standards,
free from any restrictive guidelines, in making a determination of liability.106 These trends are represented in the approach taken by Missouri in
0
Bass v. Nooney Co.1

7

In fact, the decision in Bass goes one step further. Whereas the traditional "special circumstance" cases' 08 and their modern counterparts'0 9
involve situations in which the plaintiff's severe emotional distress is not
just reasonably foreseeable but a virtual certainty, such was not the case
in Bass. The plaintiff in Bass was trapped in an elevator for thirty minutes, 1 0 an occurrence which many might consider more of an annoyance
than the infliction of severe emotional distress. Clearly, such a situation
does not rise to the same level as that of a mortuary's losing the corpse of
a family member'" or of a person finding an unpackaged prophylactic in
a soft drink.1 2 Yet the Bass court applied the same unlimited negligence
101.
102.
103.
104.

See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See cases cited supra notes 72, 80.
See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
646 S.W.2d at 772.
See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
See cases cited supra note 97.
Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 767.
See, e.g., Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980).
Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970).
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principles employed by other courts in "special circumstance" cases.'"
The court gave independent legal protection to the plaintiff's interest in
emotional tranquility and left the determination of when that interest has
been violated to be made on a case-by-case basis. In short, the Missouri
court recognized negligent infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort. With this bold step, it has fulfilled the prediction in Dillon v.
Legg" 4 that "artificial islands of exceptions [to the application of basic
tort principles], created from the fear that the legal process will not work,
usually do not withstand the waves of reality and, in time, descend into
5
oblivion.""
William Mark Hillsman

113. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772.
114. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 CaL Rptr. 72 (1968).
115. Id. at
, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 CaL Rptr. at 85.

